Why shipping keeps choosing LNG


· 6 min read
DNV’s Alternative Fuels Insight figures for 2025 put LNG at 188 of 275 alternative-fuel orders, excluding LNG carriers as a ship type. That is orders of alternative-fuel ships, not the world fleet.
The methane problem is not a secret. Climate intensity rules are already in force in Europe and they tighten on a published calendar. Capital still goes to LNG ships. The decision those orders can show is a working system today, then the engine, the calendar, the next fuel and the contract that decide whether that system stays competitive.
One documented purchase sits next to the count. CMA CGM and TotalEnergies announced supply of up to 360,000 tonnes annually from 2028 to 2040, alongside a Rotterdam bunkering joint venture whose creation was subject to regulatory approvals. The dual-fuel LNG fleet was expected to reach 123 ships by 2029. Patrick Pouyanné, TotalEnergies’ chief executive, called LNG “the most mature and immediately available solution to reduce the environmental footprint of maritime transport.” That is a supplier’s wording. The buyer’s act is the offtake. Availability is what both sides put capital on.
A fuel decision is not only a price per tonne. It is storage, delivery, permits, contractors, and whether bunkering can sit alongside cargo work without rewriting the schedule. A dense network cuts the number of those conditions an operator has to invent.
Lloyd’s Register’s Fuel for Thought: Ports report, published on 2 November 2026, put LNG bunkering at 222 ports against 25 ports actively offering methanol. That is an infrastructure advantage. It does not guarantee a given volume at a given price in any of those ports. It does say that, for LNG, the physical system is already a trading fact.
Reliability has a cost even when it is not the cheapest energy on the day. It shapes the route, the reserve, and the delay risk. LNG in the port confirms that a fuel can be lifted. It does not, by itself, confirm the origin of the gas or the emissions along the chain. The network makes LNG usable on this week’s schedule. Access to a lower-carbon methane on the ship’s later years is a separate purchase.
Under one fuel name sit different plants. Methane slip is methane that left the engine unburned. How much of it there is depends on the engine design and on load, not on the fact that the bunker was LNG.
A low-pressure four-stroke dual-fuel engine and a high-pressure two-stroke dual-fuel engine can take the same cargo of LNG and produce different greenhouse-gas intensity results. The ICCT FUMES project, with TNO and Explicit, sampled 18 ships in the low-pressure four-stroke class and found mean slip above the FuelEU default for that class. That mean is evidence about the sampled class. It is not a factor for every LNG ship, and it is not a two-stroke result.
The commercial question is therefore not only the cost of the installation. It is the combination of capital, efficiency, maintenance, slip, and the climate cost that attaches to the intensity number. An orderbook line that says LNG does not say which of those engines was ordered. Two ships can buy the same fuel and not buy the same emissions profile.
FuelEU’s intensity limit moves on a published stair. Article 4 requires the yearly average greenhouse-gas intensity of energy used on board to fall, against a fixed reference, by 2% from 2025, 6% from 2030 and 14.5% from 2035. Later steps go further. The engine can still be sound. The fuel strategy that cleared 2025 may not clear 2035.
DNV puts that horizon in those terms: an LNG-capable ship can remain compliant on fossil LNG until around 2035, depending on engine configuration, with high-pressure two-stroke plants lasting longer in that calculation than low-pressure four-stroke plants. That is not a ban date. There is no single morning after which every LNG ship is unfit. The ship may keep burning the same fuel. The gap to the limit still widens unless the mix changes. Pooling, borrowing and banking are flexibilities written into the regulation. Paying the FuelEU penalty is a different outcome.
The technical path out of fossil LNG, for these ships, is liquefied biomethane and e-methane. DNV states that both are compatible with existing LNG engines and, in principle, with existing LNG bunkering kit. That removes one problem: a large fuel-system rebuild is not a precondition.
It does not remove production, certification, price, or allocation. Shipping will compete with power and road transport for the same molecules. Øyvind Sekkesæter, lead author of DNV’s Methane in Shipping white paper, puts the procurement point directly: securing access “may require long-term offtake agreements, partnerships with fuel producers, or participation in emerging fuel value chains.”
As of late 2025, DNV’s expert briefing of that work recorded liquefied biomethane in Rotterdam at about 1,860 dollars a tonne, almost three times fossil LNG. That is a historical marker of a premium in one port. It is not a calculation of what the transition would cost on a given ship. DNV also notes that ETS exposure and FuelEU pooling can already change the net on selected EU-to-EU voyages. The barge price is not the voyage result. Origin changes the lifecycle number. Physical slip still follows the engine and how it is run.
If the owner paid for the LNG-capable ship and the charterer buys the fuel, a switch to biomethane does not automatically improve the owner’s return. The charterer pays the premium. Under the BIMCO FuelEU Maritime Clause 2024, the right to direct that value and the right to be paid for it are not the same thing. If the charter covers a complete reporting period, subclause (i) lets the charterer instruct the owner to bank or pool the compliance balance. If no period is inserted, instructions must reach the owner no later than seven days before 30 April of the verification period. Payment for any remaining surplus, under subclause (m), needs an agreed price in the clause. Leave the currency and amount blank and that payment subclause does not apply. The yard delivered the option. The premium still sits in the fuel invoice.
The orderbook favours equipment supported by an existing bunker network, and later able to take a different origin of methane. Compatibility keeps a path open to further cuts in intensity.
The choice at the yard still helps decide how much of that later cut must come from lower-GHG fuel. Engine type, efficiency and slip change how far fossil LNG will carry the ship against a tightening limit, and how much low-GHG methane is then needed to close the gap. Operation and the chosen compliance route change that need as well. Availability and price of that methane decide what covering the gap will cost. Two LNG ships can use the same bunker network and still face different dependence on an expensive molecule. The engine helps determine how much lower-GHG fuel would be needed to meet the tightening limit through the ship’s own fuel mix. The fuel market determines the price of that choice.
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