Sunshine is not enough: what eleven solar deals reveal about financing North Africa’s energy transition


· 9 min read
Africa holds 60% of the world’s best solar resources but only 1% of installed solar PV capacity, according to the International Energy Agency’s Africa Energy Outlook¹. In 2025, the continent attracted roughly 2% of global clean energy investment². The three countries we studied reflect this gap. In 2023, renewables supplied 18.5% of electricity generation in Morocco, 11.8% in Egypt and just 5.6% in Tunisia, and solar accounted for less than 6% everywhere, according to IRENA’s country profiles³.
Technology does not explain the gap. Solar panels are bought on global markets at global prices. Finance does. The IEA and the African Development Bank estimate that capital costs for utility-scale clean energy in Africa are at least two to three times⁴ those in advanced economies and China. Because nearly all of a solar plant’s cost is paid upfront, expensive or short-tenor debt can cancel out the advantage of stronger sunshine.
To understand why well-resourced projects take years to reach financial close, we conducted this research as part of the Master in Sustainability Management (MSM) at SDA Bocconi School of Management, under the academic supervision of Professor Stefano Gatti and Professor Matteo Di Castelnuovo. We built an open database of eleven utility-scale solar PV projects in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. Together they represent roughly 1 GW of capacity and USD 1 billion of investment. We tracked around 85 indicators per project and 28 derisking instruments, then calibrated a project finance model on the same data. We presented the results at the Venice Conference on Global Governance of Climate Change and Sustainability.
Our central argument is simple: credible risk allocation is the most actionable condition for bankability. Lenders price four families of risk above all:
Two caveats apply. All eleven projects reached financial close, so we study successes, not failures. And projects backed by development finance institutions (DFIs) are over-represented, because DFIs disclose more than commercial lenders.
In Morocco, the agency Masen tenders projects, buys the power, lends to the projects and takes a 25% equity stake. Noor Ouarzazate IV was financed almost entirely by a KfW development loan channelled through Masen, while Noor Laayoune and Noor Boujdour drew on Masen loans backed by Morocco’s first state-guaranteed green bond⁵. Dirham debt matched to dirham revenues removes currency mismatch at source.
The model is fast: the Noor PV I plants moved from award to financial close in about six months. But public and DFI money covers 87% of financing on average, and each public dollar mobilises only 13 cents of private capital. The risk has not disappeared. It has moved onto the public balance sheet.
Egypt took a different route. Kom Ombo, Al Subh and ACWA Benban One sell power to the state-owned utility EETC as independent power producers, the latter two through the IFC-led Benban programme⁶. A Ministry of Finance guarantee backs EETC’s obligations in all three projects, and dollar pricing or indexation shifts most currency risk to the buyer. At Kom Ombo, concessional finance from the Green Climate Fund and SEFA allowed a loan tenor roughly twice as long⁷ as local banks offer.
The result is the strongest private participation in our sample: USD 1.82 of private finance for every public or DFI dollar (Figure 1). One caveat matters. The sovereign guarantee is a contingent liability that sits outside this ratio, so Egypt’s public exposure is larger than the funded figures suggest.
Tunisia relies on concessions with the state utility STEG, financed by DFIs with concessional tranches. Its projects secured some of the lowest tariffs in the region, averaging 3.1 US cents per kWh. Sidi Bouzid II, from the 2024 round, reached financial close in June 2026⁸ with EU-backed loans and an EU grant for its grid connection.
MIGA political-risk insurance covers the equity⁹ in all four Tunisian projects. Yet no project publicly discloses a payment guarantee or a long-dated currency hedge, and three earn dinar revenues against euro debt. This is a disclosure gap, not proof that protection is absent. Still, insuring equity and cheapening debt does not by itself address the payment and currency risks lenders rank highest.

The time between award and financial close varied enormously. Noor PV I and Egypt’s Benban Round 2 plants closed within months. Kom Ombo took almost four years from its first PPA in October 2019 to financial close in August 2023, and Tunisia’s first-round concessions took between 3.8 and 4.7 years. Every month of delay exposes a bid to shifts in interest rates, equipment prices and exchange rates.
Repetition helps. Sidi Bouzid II, with the same sponsors and lenders as Tunisia’s first round, closed in about 18 months. Egypt offers a similar lesson: its first feed-in tariff round stalled over tariff and arbitration concerns, and revised, standardised documentation⁶ then helped Round 2 mobilise private investment at speed.
A survey of 142 public and private stakeholders by RES4Africa and PwC¹⁰, covering seven countries including our three, found that 60% of private respondents rated financing availability a high risk, compared with 39% of public respondents. Grid access ranked first among private concerns but seventh among public ones. When governments underestimate the risks lenders price, projects attract early developer interest and then stall before financial close.
None of the eleven projects publishes its cost of debt or weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Only two disclose an equity return and only one a minimum debt service coverage ratio. Grid connection and curtailment compensation terms are also largely undisclosed. This opacity has a real cost: governments cannot benchmark new tenders against past ones, and successful structures are hard to verify or replicate.
To fill the gap, we built the SolarRisk model, a project finance cash flow model calibrated on each project. Country risk is the starting point. Using Damodaran’s country risk estimates¹¹, Morocco’s sovereign default spread is 2.13%, compared with 6.37% for Egypt and Tunisia, which implies required equity returns of roughly 11% and 17.5% respectively.
Three findings stand out:
These are modelled counterfactuals, not estimates of any project’s actual cost of capital. To let others test and challenge our assumptions, we published the model as the free SolarRisk Calculator¹³, designed for governments, procurement agencies and DFIs preparing tenders.
North Africa does not lack sunshine, technology or ambition. It lacks risk allocation that is credible, transparent and efficient. Morocco shows that the state can deliver speed by carrying the risk itself. Egypt shows that guarantees can crowd in private capital. Tunisia shows that repetition and grid support can cut years from the road to financial close.
The policy challenge is not simply to provide more public finance. It is to identify the risks that block bankability, allocate them to the parties best able to bear them, and make that allocation credible. Getting this right would lower electricity costs at home and strengthen the case for clean power trade with Europe.
This article is based on the research paper “Risk Allocation, Derisking Instruments and the Cost of Capital in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia” (October 2026) by Katrina Davis, Shrikant Bacha, Melody Dean and Federico Puteri, students in the Master in Sustainability Management (MSM) at SDA Bocconi School of Management. The research was developed under the academic supervision of Professors Stefano Gatti and Matteo Di Castelnuovo and presented at the Venice Conference on Global Governance of Climate Change and Sustainability. The authors thank the conference organisers and participants for their valuable feedback and insights. The full research paper and project database are available from the authors upon request.
illuminem Voices is a democratic space presenting the opinions of leading Sustainability Thought Leaders, their views do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.
The world needs sustainability knowledge. At illuminem, no interest group or shareholder can influence our work. Thank you for supporting our mission to make high-quality and independent sustainability information free for all. Every contribution helps. Thank you for donating today.
Katrina Davis

Sustainable Finance · Sustainable Investment
Samwel Okoth

Corporate Sustainability · Carbon Regulations
illuminem briefings

Sustainable Finance · Public Governance
SolarQuarter

Sustainable Finance · Public Governance
The Guardian

Sustainable Finance · Adaptation
ESG Today

Sustainable Investment · Renewables