What could a Plastics Agreement realistically achieve?

On this day, three years ago, the UN Environment Assembly adopted a historic decision to negotiate a treaty to end plastic pollution. The negotiations were supposed to conclude in two years, but after five rounds of talks, consensus remains elusive. On one side, a coalition of over 100 states wish for an ambitious agreement that would limit plastic production and consumption. On the other side, major producers like China, India, and Saudi Arabia argue that the focus should be on mismanaged waste.  With a new administration, the U.S. is a wild card, as fossil fuel and chemical interests may lobby for a destructive rather than constructive role, while the new secretary of health could emphasize plastics as a public health threat."

In this political minefield, negotiators must make tough choices to succeed. During these past three years, we have monitored the negotiations very closely. Drawing on our research and engagement in international negotiations and environmental governance, here’s our view on what a successful plastics agreement might look like.

The elements of a Plastics Agreement

Multilateral environmental agreements can serve at least four functions:

1. Set Goals and Principles: Articulate general goals and principles that guide action and shape public values.
2. Establish Regulatory Standards: Define requirements to address the problem.
3. Facilitate Action: Provide funding, technology, and expertise.  
4. Ensure Adaptive Governance: Create institutions such as a conference of the parties and a secretariat to make decisions and adjust to new information.

Some agreements serve all four functions while others take a sequential approach (a “framework convention” followed by one or more “protocols”) or feature a core set of mandatory provisions with optional annexes. 

In the plastics negotiations, states agree on the four functions but disagree sharply on several key issues.

• Goals and principles: States generally favor a circular economy, improved resource efficiency, and enhanced waste management, but disagree on whether ending plastic pollution requires limiting plastics production. 

• Regulatory standards: States generally agree on addressing downstream issues (like waste management and clean-up), reporting, and national plans, but disagree on midstream issues like product design, substitutes, and microplastics and on whether to address upstream issues like production, hazardous additives, and extended producer responsibility. 

• Facilitating action: All agree on the need for finance, technology transfer, and capacity building – especially in developing countries – but the details of who will provide assistance, to whom, how, and for what, remain contentious.  

• Governance: States agree on establishing a conference of the parties and a secretariat, but disagree sharply on the choice between majority voting and consensus decision making. 

Two scenarios, both flawed

Going forward, we see two scenarios: 

1. States might negotiate a consensus-driven, least-common-denominator agreement in the UN process. 
2. High-ambition states could forge a maximalist agreement as a “coalition of the willing.” 

Each option raises difficult questions for both sides.  

For major producing states: what would be the reputational costs of blocking consensus? Conversely, how might they be negatively impacted by an ambitious agreement among a coalition of the willing?  And what compromises would be acceptable to avoid these costs? 

For high-ambition states: what concessions would be acceptable to reach consensus?  Does a “contract zone” exist – an overlap between what the two sides are willing to accept?  If not, is a go-it-alone strategy a viable alternative?  Would an ambitious agreement be effective if it lacked the participation of big producing states such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United States?  And would the foreign relations costs be justified?  

The issues raised by both scenarios – a modest compromise or an overly ambitious pact – underscore the need for an alternative that can address the divergent concerns at play while delivering real progress.

Getting to Yes: a modular approach 

Does such a third option exist? What is realistically achievable? First, despite the divergent positions of states, a consensus agreement is within reach with provisions on objectives, institutions, downstream measures (like waste management), national plans, reporting, finance, and capacity building. Second, major producers are unlikely to accept measures on primary plastic production or majority decisionmaking. This leaves middle-tier issues – such as product design, non-plastic substitutes, and microplastics asmain question marks.

To some degree, these middle-tier issues could be addressed through the normal tools of treaty negotiation – for example:

• Using constructively ambiguous language.
• Giving states flexibility (presenting a menu of options or allowing states to self-determine their commitments), rather than prescribing exactly what they must do.
• Adjusting legal force by making some provisions recommendations rather than requirements.
• Extending implementation and compliance timelines.

But a more radical restructuring of the agreement could help break the deadlock, modeled on successful agreements like MARPOL and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, where a core agreement is complemented by optional modules on particular issues. The core plastics agreement would address governance arrangements and issues where there is broad international consensus—such as cleaning up legacy plastics and improving waste management systems. Optional annexes would address more contentious topics like product design standards and limits on hazardous additives. 

This architecture could potentially satisfy the varied interests of both high-ambition states and those wary of regulatory measures by allowing them to progress at different speeds, with some accepting the optional annexes immediately and others deferring.  It could allow the treaty to secure broad participation immediately, while leaving room for growth as circumstances and knowledge change.  

Our view on the matter

We believe rethinking the structure of the plastics agreement is both warranted and feasible. An agreement that omits middle-tier issues would set a low bar and discourage future ambition. Conversely, a high-ambition agreement would require a “coalition of the willing” possibly outside the UN framework, an option best left as a last resort. A modular treaty with a “start-and-strengthen” approach could address these issues flexibly. It could both provide immediate action and lay the groundwork for future evolution through periodic reviews, additional protocols, or strengthened compliance mechanisms. Ultimately, such a modular design might make consensus possible and deliver a dynamic, effective global agreement on ending plastic pollution—one that grows in ambition as collective understanding and resolve deepen.

Check Data Hub™ for the sustainability performance of the companies contributing the most to global plastic pollution: ExxonMobil, Dow (30.7 mtCO₂), Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo (3.4 mtCO2), Nestlé (3.5 mtCO2)...

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