The EU-China opportunity: Innovation, scale, and a strategic dialogue for science and the climate?

With the war in Iran, the United States is now seen as a “revisionist power” — even in Southeast Asia. In an interview with Reuters, Singapore’s Foreign Minister recently said this, adding that “some would even call it a disruptor.” This reflects an ongoing geopolitical realignment, which opens a window for restructuring EU–China relations.

Beijing appears cautiously willing to step through that window. The first European Parliament delegation to Beijing in eight years confirms that something is changing. The question is whether this will lead to strategic renegotiation or fragmented cooperation.

According to Engin Eroglu, Chair of the European Parliament’s China Delegation, the visit did “break the ice and establish a solid basis for future dialogue.” And produced some positive results.

Europe, argues Eroglu, must urgently move beyond the current win–lose dynamic. The first step lies within us — and a key role belongs to innovation. Eroglu calls for a reallocation of public resources towards research rather than short-term subsidies.

I agree we need a win-win dynamic — especially in science, energy, ecological transition, and future materials. China now leads in nearly all scientific sectors relevant for the future. In 2025, R&D spending exceeded 3.9 trillion yuan (2.8% of GDP, above OECD average), with progress in quantum computing, AI, biotech, and humanoid robots. As President Macron of France said at Davos 2026, “China is welcome — but we need more Chinese green tech FDI in Europe.” That requires agreed rules for the emerging ecological economy and trade flows, at a time when the WTO urgently needs reform. The EU and China — with their large markets and regulatory power — are best placed to lead.

I speak from experience as the head of an award-winning innovative SME in the EU. Our solutions in virtual twins and digital DNA optimise infrastructure, territorial governance, and industrial systems, reducing waste and increasing total resource productivity. The EU’s greatest weakness is not technology; it is scale. China’s strength lies in moving seamlessly from pilot projects to large-scale deployment, alsoin the public sector. In the EU, even successful innovations struggle due to fragmented procurement, risk-averse public buyers, and a lack of coordinated deployment frameworks. I witnessed this openness to scale firsthand at the Zhongguancun Forum, where China’s strategic direction is measured — and where the gap between Chinese execution and European hesitation becomes fully clear.

What strikes me most is the pace. The innovation gap is no longer theoretical: operational AI, autonomous vehicles, and humanoid robots are already integrated into production processes. In China, innovation is becoming an infrastructure of power. In 2024, basic research reached 250 billion yuan (+10.5%). The space economy, open-source AI, 76 newly approved drugs, and biotech investments exceeding $130 billion all point to a system organising its future around knowledge.

Cooperation on shared global challenges could lower costs and accelerate transitions for both sides. That is where I saw substantial potential for concrete collaboration. I represent a French SME, but the perspective must be  that of the common market — drawing on networks of innovation leaders across the EU.

Market opportunities are significant, but they cannot be pursued in isolation. EU countries must coordinate, building on regional and industrial specialisations, avoiding internal competition, and optimising investment. The Draghi Report is instructive.

EU–China synergies emerge where capabilities are complementary — for example, in virtual twins for energy and materials, industrial IoT, eco-design, clean AI, and Earth observation. A concrete example is the parallel use of Galileo (EU) and Gaofen (China) satellite systems, which could generate dual-source geospatial platforms for industry, infrastructure, and territorial management. Data control could be guaranteed, benefits shared—a model that could accelerate development on both sides while managing strategic risks.

Cooperation is also decisive for climate and disaster resilience. 

Market openness and reciprocity are central. Greater Chinese corporate presence in Europe — through investment and joint ventures in advanced sectors — can strengthen EU supply chains. Conversely, broader participation by European companies in Chinese tenders and industrial programmes would allow tangible rebalancing of economic relations.

Without China, Europe’s green transition slows down. The United Kingdom’s approach to offshore wind in 2026 illustrates this: Mingyang Smart Energy turbines were blocked from a Scottish tender on national security grounds, while tariffs on key components — many sourced from China — were simultaneously removed, lowering costs and supporting the UK’s ambition to become a clean energy superpower. This reflects a deliberate balance between security and industrial pragmatism. Deindustrialising Europe is not the answer; manufacturing together is.

Scientific and technological diplomacy, alongside climate diplomacy, remains one of the strongest channels of dialogue. It is a space where technical cooperation becomes strategic, shaping the rules for trade and markets in a future low-resource, high-efficiency economy.

Challenges remain, as do red lines and mutual distrust. From 2026, the EU has sharply restricted Chinese participation in Horizon Europe, particularly in sensitive areas such as AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, quantum technologies, and 5G. China’s “Seven Sons of National Defence” universities are fully excluded.

Chinese perceptions of the EU are also evolving for the better. A fragmented Union is now seen more as a risk: unreliable, incapable of guaranteeing regulatory coherence or predictability. In a global context marked by tariffs, conficts, and polycrises, China increasingly recognises that a strong EU is a necessary partner to uphold the multilateral order.