Nuclear: anniversaries, dreams, and reality


· 7 min read
This article is also published on Sapere Scienza, in Italian
In 2026, we mark significant anniversaries of the two great nuclear accidents: 40 years since Chernobyl, 15 since Fukushima. Two events deemed to have negligible probability, but which unfortunately came to pass: one through human error, the other through natural catastrophe. Two tragedies that have indelibly shaped the fate of nuclear power technology, undermining its market prospects and exposing its unresolved problems.
Defining the precise human cost of the two disasters is practically impossible. Estimating the number of Chernobyl victims from radiological exposure remains one of the most debated and controversial subjects in the field of environmental epidemiology. Depending on the source, the figures range from fewer than a hundred to tens of thousands. For both accidents, the indirect harms – particularly psychological and social – have been and remain severe, and by their nature are not easily quantified. Hundreds of thousands of people had their lives upended forever: it is widely documented that, in these places, rates of depression, alcoholism and suicide rose.
Less controversial, by contrast, is the estimate of material damage: Chernobyl and Fukushima have been the two most expensive industrial accidents of all time. The direct and indirect damage to the economies of the countries involved, together with the costs of decontamination and remediation, are today assessed – in each case – within a broad range centred on around €400 billion.
This is a cost set to weigh on future generations still. At both sites, in fact, the situation is far from resolved. At Chernobyl, the containment structure known as the NSC (New Safe Confinement), which covers the remains of the reactor that exploded in 1986, will have to provide protection until 2116. In the meantime, the challenge remains of removing the molten radioactive material – the so-called "magma" – that lies beneath the old concrete sarcophagus, built forty years ago and now at risk of collapse. At Fukushima, the removal of nuclear fuel from the three reactors that went into meltdown will not begin before 2037 – 26 years after the accident – and will be a gigantic engineering challenge.
This last figure gives a measure of how far nuclear technology raises a question of intergenerational justice. It is an issue that arises even in the absence of accidents: the management of high-level nuclear waste requires identifying and certifying as "safe", for tens of thousands of years, geological storage sites at a depth of around 500 m. These are timescales that disorient, considering that human civilisation in its historically documented form is less than 6,000 years old. Safety authorities now require these repositories to carry signage immune to the changes in languages and cultures that will inevitably occur. In practice, we must strive to devise warnings comprehensible to some unsuspecting descendant who, 50,000 years from now, might stumble upon our unpleasant legacy.
Faced with the scale of the costs associated with accidents, and with time horizons that defy all economic planning, it is understandable that insurance companies do not cover the health and material damage to people. Nor the remediation costs, the extent of which cannot be estimated in advance. In Japan, the party called upon to cover the costs of last resort is the State and not TEPCO, the company that owned the Fukushima plant.
Since the Chernobyl disaster, the global nuclear industry has entered a profound crisis from which it has never recovered. Over the decades – and still today – a "nuclear renaissance" has been announced time and again, only to vanish systematically. To understand the current state of the sector, it is useful to begin with some figures.
Compared with thirty years ago, the number of operating nuclear reactors in the world has fallen slightly, while their installed capacity has risen slightly. This increase has only marginally covered the enormous rise in global electricity demand: in 1996 nuclear power met 17% of world demand, today it stands at just 9%. The average age of reactors remains high. The lowest value is recorded globally (33 years), thanks to the contribution of new Chinese plants. In France the average age of the nuclear fleet is 40 years, in the United States it reaches 44. Neither country has any reactors under construction.
In Europe, only three "new" projects are active: one in Slovakia (foundation stone laid 39 years ago) and two in the United Kingdom. For the latter, delays of more than ten years have accumulated, while the budgeted costs have more than doubled. The trends in the nuclear industry within market economies are damning, as demonstrated by the financial crises that have struck a string of companies in the sector, including Toshiba, Westinghouse and Areva. In 2022 the French government intervened by renationalising 100% of the heavily indebted giant EDF (Électricité de France).
In the global nuclear landscape, state-controlled economies dominate today: over 90% of reactors under construction are based on Russian or Chinese technology, and more than half of the roughly 70 plants currently being built are located in China. Nevertheless, the Chinese boom shrinks when set against the trend in other technologies. In 2025, 1.1 GW of new nuclear capacity was connected to the grid, against 435 GW of wind plus solar. In China, nuclear power today meets around 5% of national electricity needs, while solar and wind together reach 25%. The trajectory set by Beijing towards the electrification of final consumption clearly indicates that nuclear power is not the linchpin of the strategy.
The mooted revival of nuclear power in Italy sits within this complex historical and international picture. And since the reality is anything but buoyant, the debate has been shifted onto technologies that do not exist on the market today: small modular reactors – sometimes invoked in their "fourth generation", still a distant prospect – and fusion. This is not a responsible way to confront increasingly urgent structural problems: the high cost of energy and chronic dependence on foreign supply.
A curious feature of the Italian debate is the way France is held up as a model. In reality, the French electricity system – built around 57 large reactors, a disproportionate number – is showing growing signs of strain. Like all European countries, France too is installing new renewable capacity; over the past ten years this has effectively marginalised the equivalent of around seven reactors. On average, almost half of the French nuclear fleet is not used for domestic needs: the plants are either shut down or producing for export. Those reactors were designed to run continuously, but are increasingly modulated to adapt to the trend in overall supply, causing increased operational stress on now-ageing infrastructure. Looking ahead, the scope for French exports tends to shrink as other European countries build up their own renewable capacity. French nuclear power is becoming something of an elephant in the room of the European electricity system. It will require ever more careful and shared management, also in view of a not-too-distant decommissioning, whose implications cannot be regarded as a matter for France alone.
Nuclear power has undeniable strengths: a reactor in operation produces energy around the clock in every season, emits no CO2 or pollutants during operation, and occupies a limited footprint. If you stop there, it is the perfect solution. But technologies never exist in the abstract: they must be inserted into the real world. And this is precisely the stress test that nuclear power has never passed. There is a superficial tendency to attribute the endless crisis of nuclear power to external factors: environmentalists, incompetent politicians, overly strict regulators. Too convenient. The crisis of nuclear power lies entirely in its intrinsic weaknesses and contradictions, which in 70 years it has never resolved.
The last time nuclear power was discussed in Italy (2010-2011), photovoltaics was marginal, wind was taking its first steps, batteries had prohibitive costs, smart grids were just a fine idea on paper, the nuclear industry was promising cost reductions, a power plant had never found itself in a theatre of war, and nuclear proliferation was considered a matter of the past.
Let us discuss everything openly, but let us not pretend we are still 15 years ago. Today nuclear power is no longer the only alternative to coal and gas, as it was at the time of Chernobyl and Fukushima. Everything has changed; let us calmly acknowledge this and turn the page.
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