Intergovernmental expert group on environmental crimes fails to reach consensus

Background

In 2024 the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) at the Twelfth Session of the Conference of the Parties (CoP12) adopted a resolution[1] on crimes that affect the environment (CAE). It followed a series of earlier UN resolutions on the topic.

Amongst other things, the UNTOC Resolution on CAE established an open-ended intergovernmental expert group (IEG) on CAE falling withing the scope of the UNTOC. Its mandate included taking stock of how the UNTOC is being applied to address CAE, identifying gaps in the international legal framework to prevent and combat CAE, and how to respond to those gaps, including the “possibility, feasibility and merits” of any additional protocol to the Convention.

The IEG first officially met from 30 June to 2 July 2025 and it held its second, and final, meeting from 24 to 26 February 2026. At its second meeting the IEG considered “any consensual recommendations” to be adopted and transmitted to the UNTOC CoP13 in October 2026, based on a draft set of recommendations prepared by the IEG Chair with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The IEG meetings were not open to observers from civil society. However, the Chair of the IEG, Carlos Sánchez del Águila from Peru, engaged with non-State actors through a series of briefings and panel sessions. Organisations with UN intergovernmental status, such as INTERPOL, UNEP and IUCN, were able to participate in the meetings.

An estimated 100 States and close to 300 experts from around the world participated in the meetings of the IEG, either directly or indirectly, reflecting the high-level of interest in its work. I was grateful to be included on the IUCN delegation[2] for the second meeting of the IEG, which enabled me to observe the work of the IEG. While the meeting was closed to civil society, its deliberations were not held in private and what was said in open session can be shared and was shared openly by many participating States.

This brief article represents my own understanding of the discussion. The views expressed herein are mine alone and not those of any other individual or organisation. In writing this piece, I decided not to attribute any positions to any State or organisation.

No consensus reached

After two days of deliberations in February, the IEG could not reach consensus on any recommendations to transmit to UNTOC CoP13. Reaching consensus on such a diverse and evolving topic, and within a limited time, was always going to present a challenge, and, for reasons I will elaborate upon, this outcome was disappointing but not surprising.

The Chair will submit his own summary of the IEG’s deliberations to UNTOC CoP13[3]. In this context, it is important to recall that the IEG was not a decision-making body. As was pointed out by several States during the discussions, the UNTOC CoP is the decision-making body.

Positions taken by IEG members

The IEG was established as an intergovernmental expert group. While most States sent delegations with significant specific subject matter expertise on CAE, others sent experienced diplomats, well-versed in intergovernmental negotiations.

Most States participating in the IEG process favoured a protocol, as expressed thought written responses to a UNODC questionnaire and at the IEG meeting itself. A smaller, but well organised and articulate, group of States were opposed to a protocol(s).

My starting point is that it’s unhelpful to try and demonise or portray those States that did not support a protocol(s) as the enemy. They are not. Rather, they are sovereign States that hold, for different reasons, a point of view that does not align with the majority, while noting that a dialogue on CAE will continue throughout 2026. It is important to engage, seek to understand every perspective, openly debate differing points of view, and search for common ground.

Two panel sessions were held during the February IEG meeting, at which delegates from eight States made presentations. We heard detailed case studies from experts from six States about the challenges they encounter in preventing and combating transboundary, organised CAE, including the issue of dual criminality, and how a protocol(s) could assist them carry out their law enforcement responsibilities. These real-world experiences were powerful, and they made a compelling case in support of a protocol(s).

Two States made presentations that did not support a protocol(s). Both presentations were made by experienced and articulate diplomats; rather than from a field-based perspective. While various issues were raised, the opposition to a protocol(s) revolved around one generic, and three more specific, reasons.

The generic argument, which applies to any new international legal instrument, is that States should not invest the time, effort, and resources needed to negotiate a protocol(s) at this time, especially given the current precarious position of the UN. For others, the scale, nature and impacts of CAE, including the estimated loss of State revenue of $7 Billion $12 Billion annually, made a compelling case in favour of expeditiously investing in such an endeavour.

The most oft-repeated and more specific reasons[4] given for opposing a protocol(s) were the:

• interrelationship of a protocol(s) with Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs);

• impacts on State sovereignty; and

• obscure scope of CAE.

Of these reasons to oppose a protocol(s) the first two can be quite easily addressed. The third reason is one that requires a better response than has been offered to date through the IEG process. I’ll briefly respond to these three issues in turn, noting that this is a brief, and not in any way a comprehensive, summary of my understanding of the various matters raised.

Interrelationship of a protocol(s) with MEAs

One State, supported by a few others, expressed the view that a protocol(s) could overlap and encroach on the mandates of MEAs, with specific reference to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal’ (the Basel Convention) and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’ (CITES). This is a point that was raised in other fora last year, including the UN Environment Assembly, and, as I personally observed, as a part of the G20 negotiations.

This is an issue that I feel can be quite easily responded to, and at the request of several States I made a brief intervention at the IEG meeting itself.

Panel dicussion session

In short, there are an estimated 1,400 MEAs. Of them, UNODC found that only two seek to criminalise or penalise certain conduct, namely, the Basel Convention, which requires Parties to criminalize violations of its provisions, and CITES, which requires Parties to penalise certain violations of its provisions – noting that CITES does not specifically require criminalisation.

Basel and CITES are both environmental agreements. Neither of them is designed to tackle transnational, organised crime (TOC) and the treaty texts do not contain any provisions on how States should cooperate to do so, such as we find in the UNTOC.

Rather, these environmental agreements are about how Parties agree to cooperate to address an environmental issue of global concern to achieve a desired environmental objective. Achieving these environmental objectives, and those of many other MEAs, is seriously undermined by TOC, yet MEAs acting alone are totally incapable of tackling TOC.

To illustrate this point, I would like to give the example of CITES, where I served as Secretary-General from 2010-2018. CITES’ objective is to ensure international trade in certain species of wild fauna and flora does not threaten their survival. Achieving this objective is seriously undermined by TOC that occurs at an industrial scale and has massive consequences.

However, CITES was not designed, mandated, equipped or resourced to tackle TOC. It’s a trade-related treaty, not a crime-related treaty. CITES desperately needs the support of the agencies and treaties that dealt with TOC to tackle these serious crimes – especially the UNTOC, that is designed, mandated, equipped and resourced to tackle TOC.

That is why during my term as CITES Secretary-General, I personally reached out to the Executive Director of UNODC, the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Crime (CCPCJ) and the UN treaties, as well as INTERPOL, The World Bank and the World Customs Organisation, to scale up efforts to tackle wildlife trafficking.

We reached out to them not because we needed support implementing the Convention, but because of their leading role in preventing and combating TOC, which went beyond the Convention’s scope and capacity. This included creating and operationalising the highly successful International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC).

In short, there is no overlap or intrusion into the mandate of MEAs. In fact, it’s quite the contrary. Tackling TOC goes beyond the mandate and capacity of MEAs. Tackling TOC is something we need to advance through the treaties and processes hosted by the UN in Vienna.

Having UNTOC, and ICCWC partners, address transnational and organised CAE represents a practical, effective, and much needed synergy between international agreements.

Impacts on state sovereignty

This concern was expressed by several States, but it was a little hard to fully understand what was meant, other than in the context of the issue of scope, which I address below. Any new international agreement can result in a need to change national laws to meet new international obligations, just as we saw with CITES.

When CITES entered into force in July 1975, only a fraction of Parties had legislation in place that aligned with the obligations set out in the Convention. CITES even established a national legislation project to support Parties develop national legislation that meets their obligations under the Convention.

A new protocol(s) on CAE may well include obligations that require legislative changes at the national level; but only for those States that become a Party to the protocol(s). This is not an infringement of State sovereignty. However, as best as I could understand it, the concerns about State sovereignty appeared to revolve around ambiguity about the scope of CAE, including the possible inclusion of crimes that are more domestic in nature, rather than those that are TOC and falling within the scope of the UNTOC.

If the issue of scope can be adequately clarified, concerns about State sovereignty, and the interrelationship with MEAs, could possibly be overcome.

Obscure scope of CAE

The issue of a lack of clarity about the scope of any protocol(s) on CAE was raised by two States in their panel presentations and by several other States from the floor. It’s a legitimate issue that needs to be further thought through as we go forwards.

This IEG process was established as an expert group designed to elicit a set of agreed recommendations, not to prescribe a way forward or launch a negotiation. It was agreed that the IEG was working under the UNTOC, and hence the scope was limited to those crimes that are transnational in nature and involve an organised criminal group.[5] As one State highlighted, the actual scope of a protocol(s) is something that a negotiation would determine. However, understandably, it still left several States dissatisfied about exactly what we were talking about.

In this context, it is worth recalling that CAE is not defined[6], nor is there an accepted list of CAE. What specific crimes are included under the chapeau of CAE varies from State to State. There is a need to better articulate the possible scope of a protocol(s), with more specificity about what crimes and conduct is being put forward to be included in a possible protocol(s).

While States may wish to penalise some conduct that affects the environment, they may not always want to criminalise it or include it into an international agreement, and they may not all be TOC. For example, this may be the case with some conduct in the fisheries sector. States will need to carefully reflect upon the conduct they seek to criminalise though an international agreement to help address these concerns over the scope of any future agreement.

Further, the CAE that States seek to include in an international agreement may evolve over time. For example, there is an emerging consensus on including wildlife trafficking, with growing support on timber (if it is seen as falling outside of wildlife), but less consensus on other CAE. As such, it has been proposed that States may wish to consider an additional protocol that enables specific crimes to be included over time through a series of Annexes.

One area of consensus

Despite the diverging views, there appeared to be consensus amongst participating States on the severity of CAE and of the need to strengthen the national and international response. How to achieve that objective is what was contested, and, hence, not reaching consensus on a set of recommendations, although disappointing, was not a surprise.

Nonetheless, the IEG exercise was highly valuable, and well-managed by the Chair, with the support of UNODC. It brought many States and experts together to discuss an important issue of common concern, triggered the drafting of useful background papers and surveys, and allowed all concerned to learn more about the different positions of participating States.

IEG Chair, Carlos Sanchez del Aguila, Peru

Key upcoming events 

Following the February IEG meeting, and before the UNTOC CoP13, there will be two events of interest, the UN Crime Congress in Abu Dhabi from 25 to 30 April and the 35th session of the CCPCJ from 1 to 5 June. The main outcome document from the UN Crime Congress, to be called the Abu Dhabi Declaration, is being pre-negotiated. The drafts seen to date include several specific paragraphs on CAE, adding important impetus to UNTOC CoP13.

There are also several ancillary events proposed on CAE at the Congress, coming from States and civil society. One would not expect the CCPCJ to receive any draft resolutions on CAE, but it will be an important meeting point on the way to the UNTOC CoP13.

It is anticipated that a State or States will present a draft Resolution to UNTOC CoP13 to establish a process for negotiating a new protocol(s) on CAE. Such a Resolution, if submitted, is unlikely to be adopted by consensus, but the UNTOC CoP rules of procedure provide that where there is no consensus, a resolution can be adopted on substantive issues by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting (with a simple majority for administrative issues).

The year 2026 will determine whether the world makes a step-change to the way in which we prevent and combat transnational, organised CAE. Following the IEG, the outcome remains an open question, and States, intergovernmental bodies, civil society and various coalitions and initiatives will actively engage in all these processes to advance their own perspectives.

Whoever has the most persuasive argument should prevail, and the organisations I am associated with will continue to lend our support to States, upon request, to advance efforts to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and combat these serious and highly destructive crimes.

UN Vienna

[1] The UNTOC Resolution is named ‘Enhancing measures to prevent and combat crimes that affect the environment falling within the scope of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’. It was proposed by Brazil, France, and Peru and after long negotiations adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 44 States.

[2] As Chair of the IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law Specialist Group on CAE.

[3] His report does not require agreement by the IEG.

[4] There were also many interventions from the floor with States expressing support, or opposition, to a protocol(s), or raising matters of particular interest to a State. Some of the issues raised included, the suggestion that States focus on implementing the UNTOC and agree on new resolutions and guidelines, with others noting the vast amount of existing resolutions and guidelines; it was premature to consider a protocol(s) at this stage; any future process should proceed by consensus (although the Cybercrime Convention got off to a contentious start); and a gap with political will.

[5] As defined by the UNTOC.

[6] And nor do I think it should be – it serves as a chapeau under which specific crimes can be described.

UN Vienna

This article is also published on LinkedIn. illuminem Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Sustainability & Energy writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

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